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This paper first discusses how the market is delineated in some recent antitrust 
cases in the printed media industry. It evaluates the extent to which the main features of 
the industry are incorporated into the analysis and affect market definition. In addition 
we argue that an econometric analysis that does not incorporate these features can lead 
to biased estimates of elasticities. As demand substitution is a crucial element for 
defining market, bad estimates of elasticities could blur the boundaries of relevant 
markets. Second we propose a simple model that encompasses these features and in 
particular the two-sidedness of the market. Thirdly, we review some empirical papers 
that analyze the issue of demand estimation in printed media. Finally, we perform a 
statistical estimation on a dataset of magazines in order to provide a measure of the 
possible bias that could arise in the estimation of elasticities when one does not use a 
proper model. 
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Rapid technological change in media markets emphasizes the importance of 
delineating relevant markets in this industry by and large and in the press industry 
particularly. Indeed, the degree of substitutability among different newspapers, but also 
between newspapers and internet sites, or different kinds of television or cable channel 
is a key element in competition analysis. 
Recent theoretical advances4 stress the two-sided feature of this industry, which 
should affect market definition. Media outlets compete not only for readership or 
audience, but also for advertisers, which in turn are attracted by the possibility of 
reaching potential consumers. The advent of new media and the recent technological 
advances in information transmission have an impact on the degree of substitutability 
between different media, and also on the ways in which advertising messages are 
conveyed to the public. Therefore the evolution of media markets creates closer 
interconnections between different media services with regard to both the circulation 
side and the advertising side. In this context, antitrust agencies and regulators should 
take into account the changing features of these markets when addressing issues of 
market definition and assessing the degree of substitutability between different media 
outlets. 
At least three notions then should drive the definition of relevant markets in the 
press industry. The first one, as we just said, is two-sidedness. The markets for news 
and advertising are closely linked by inter-market network externalities. Our conjecture 
is that, failing to consider this link may lead to a biased estimation of own- and cross-
price elasticities. Secondly, product differentiation (both horizontal and vertical) is a 
crucial factor in readers’ choice, and must be properly accounted for in order to obtain 
accurate cross-price elasticities. Finally, in part as a result of the application of the first 
two notions, a correct estimation of the potential market size is required. Indeed, the 
competitive constraint imposed by the substitutability between printed media and other 
media like television or internet, which do not belong to the same relevant sub-market 
of printed media, might have significant effects on the levels of elasticities. 
Note that the delineation of relevant markets is a competition policy notion 
aimed at identifying the competitive constraints faced by a firm or a group of firms. It is 
not a concept developed or employed by microeconomic theory. The objective of 
market definition is to search for the smallest set of products competing between them 
in order to guide the antitrust investigation. In the search process, three competitive 
constraints can play a role: demand substitution, supply substitution and potential 
competition.5 
Here we mainly focus on demand substitution. The usual criterion adopted by 
antitrust agencies to evaluation the strength of this competitive constraint is by means of 
the so-called SSNIP (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Prices) test. 
According to this test, a set of products (or geographical areas) are considered as 
belonging to the same product (or geographic) market if a hypothetical monopolist on 
this market could profitably rise prices above the current level by a given amount 
                                                 
4 See Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2004). 
5 See European Commission (1997). 
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(usually 5-10%) in a non-transitory way.6 If this is the case the set of products 
considered constitutes a separate market because consumers do not substitute away after 
a price increase. On the other hand, if the price increase would not be profitable, there 
are other products that are substitutes to the ones considered, and demand would be 
partly conveyed to these products if prices increase. In this case, the set of products 
considered for market definition should be enlarged to include also closer substitutes of 
the previous set of products. The SSNIP test should be performed on this wider market 
and the exercise should continue with further enlargements of the market until the 
SSNIP test gives a positive answer, i.e., a price increase by a hypothetical monopolist 
would be profitable. 
The type of reasoning that is behind the SSNIP test should drive the analysis of 
the assessment of market definition. In practice however, the SSNIP test is not 
implemented. It serves as a guide to obtain indirect evidence on the effects of a price 
increase. One of the main pieces of information that are clearly involved in the 
mechanism of SSNIP test and can be used to draw inferences about the effect of a price 
increase on demand are own- and cross-price elasticities. Indeed own-price elasticity 
allows us to evaluate the profitability of a price increase because it measures the 
decrease in demand due to a price increase. Cross-price elasticity is obviously important 
to evaluate the competitive constraints provided by other products. It is particularly 
useful in the case where the magnitude of own elasticity would suggest that a price 
increase by a hypothetical monopolist would not be profitable and then it is necessary to 
find the closer substitutes to proceed with further steps of the SSNIP test. 
Own- and cross-price elasticities can be estimated on the basis of a correctly 
built and estimated econometric model. Therefore econometric models are an important 
tool for the implementation of the SSNIP test. As we further discuss, the peculiar 
features of the media markets that we previously pointed out call for special 
considerations when formulating an econometric model for this industry. 
The objective of the paper is fourfold. First, we discuss the approach adopted to 
delineate markets in some recent antitrust cases and evaluate the extent to which two-
sidedness and the other above-mentioned elements have been incorporated into the 
antitrust analysis. We argue that an econometric analysis that does not incorporate both 
sides of a media market can lead to biased estimates of elasticities. We then propose a 
simple econometric model that encompasses the three distinctive features of this 
industry outlined above. Thirdly, we review some empirical papers that analyze the 
issue of demand estimation in printed media. Finally, we perform a statistical estimation 
on a dataset of magazines in order to show the possible bias that could arise in the 
estimation of elasticities when one does not use the proper model. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we review the approaches 
to market definition adopted in some recent decisions by competition agencies. In 
Section 3 we sketch an econometric model that would allow estimating the demand on 
both the readers’ and the advertising sides. In Section 4 we discuss the growing 
empirical literature on printed media. In Section 5 we show results from the estimation 
exercise and we conclude in Section 6. 
 
 
                                                 
6 For a discussion on the SSNIP test and its implementation, see Motta (2004), ch. 3. See also, for an 
econometric application, Ivaldi and Lörincz (2005). 
MARKET DEFINITION IN THE PRINTED MEDIA INDUSTRY 
 - 4 -
2. Case Review 
 
Here we present the arguments that antitrust authorities have considered in 
practice for defining media markets in recent cases, both in Europe and in the United 
States. In particular we focus on the extent to which the peculiar characteristics of the 
printed media industry have been incorporated into the antitrust investigation. The 
objective is to evaluate whether the actual practice introduces a bias in the analysis in 
the light of the recent theoretical developments. For instance, as we argue below with 
reference to a specific case, this is a crucial issue particularly when the assessment of 
relevant markets relies on econometric tools. We show that the econometric analysis 
might be biased if the specific characteristics of the industry (and particularly two-
sidedness) are not accounted for. 
The definition of relevant markets in printed media industries should take into 
account the distinctive features of competition in this industry. First of all, there is 
competition between newspapers belonging to the same product group. A first task 
consists therefore of assessing the strength of substitution between different types of 
product in terms of content (titles of general information versus specialized titles, for 
instance), quality (tabloids or quality press), and frequency. 
Another important dimension of printed media is their geographic and spatial 
location. The majority of titles have a local scope, and therefore the extent to which 
there are overlaps between different titles affects the strength of competition in the local 
markets. 
Finally, the boundaries of the relevant market depend also on the competitive 
constraint provided by other, non-newspaper media, namely other printed media, 
television, or internet. The assessment of these boundaries should also account for the 
rapid growth of new forms of information transmission that are provided by 
technological change. 
The analysis of these elements constitutes the core of the analysis of relevant 
markets in most antitrust decisions in the EU. For some recent merger cases in the 
written press industry, the European Commission analyzes relevant markets according 
to the criteria mentioned above. In the Recoletos / Unedisa case,7 for example, product 
categories are defined according to frequency (daily and non-daily publications), 
content (general information, sport and financial papers), and quality of the publication 
(tabloids or quality press). In the case of magazines, further divisions is made according 
to content. The same criteria for product market definition are used in other decisions of 
the Commission, for example in the cases Gruner+Jahr / Financial Times / JV and 
Newspaper Publishing.8 
The same approach is adopted by the Italian antitrust authority: in the Ballarino / 
Grandi quotidiani decision. In subsequent decisions,9 the market of daily newspapers of 
                                                 
7 Case No. IV/M.1041 - RECOLETOS / UNEDISA, 01/02/1999. 
8 Cases No. IV/M.1455 - GRUNER+JAHR /FINANCIAL TIMES/ JV, 20/04/1999 and No. IV/M.423 - 
NEWSPAPER PUBLISHING, 14/03/1994 respectively. 
9 See Provv. n. 3354 Ballarino/ Grandi quotidiani (26/10/1996), Provv. n. 4822 Italia Oggi Editori / Il 
Sole 24 Ore (20/3/1997) and following decisions. 
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general information is considered as separate from the market of daily business or sport 
newspapers.10 
The geographic dimension applies to cases involving local newspapers. In some 
recent cases in the U.K., the Competition Commission devotes an important part of the 
relevant market analysis to the assessment of competition in local markets. In the 
decision Regional Independent Media Ltd and Gannett UK Ltd/ Johnston Press plc/ 
Guardian Media Group, the competition assessment focuses on the local area analysis, 
as the titles involved compete primarily for a local readership. In particular, the decision 
identifies “overlap areas”, i.e., areas in which at least one newspaper of each of the 
publishers involved achieves a household penetration rate of 10 per cent or more. The 
analysis is conducted by looking at the likely competitive impact of the proposed 
transfers in any given overlap area, taking also into account “core areas”, which 
represent “that part of a newspaper’s circulation or distribution area in which the bulk of 
its copies are circulated or distributed”. 
In the above-mentioned Ballarino / Grandi quotidiani decision (as well as in 
subsequent decisions), the Italian antitrust authority defines local and national 
publications as belonging to two separate (albeit adjacent) markets. This is motivated by 
the observation that the information provided in local papers has mostly a local scope, 
and therefore their readership is different from that of national titles. However, it should 
also be taken into account that national newspapers have progressively increased the 
coverage of local events by introducing dedicated sections in the newspaper or, more 
recently, by bundling the national paper with a local one. Moreover, many of the 
newspapers with a national circulation have “core areas” (as defined above) that 
coincide with local areas like regions or big cities. Therefore the overlapping between 
national and local papers seems to have increased over the last decade, and this should 
be taken into account in future antitrust decisions. 
Therefore, at least from a demand-side perspective, printed media markets are 
usually segmented in relatively tiny sub-markets according to their frequency, content, 
and local characterization. 
Both the European Commission and national antitrust agencies have considered 
the substitutability of printed media with other media services in determining the 
competitive constraints faced by the firms under consideration. Written press is usually 
regarded as distinct from other media products. In the Recoletos / Unedisa case, the 
Commission argues that written press offers a product that is not substitutable with TV 
and radio services in terms of the range and depth of information provided. Similarly, 
the UK Competition Commission, in the Newsquest Ltd / Independent News and Media 
plc case, explains that, albeit there is some competition to local newspapers coming 
from other forms of printed media (advertising-only publications, niche titles, 
directories and direct mail), non-printed media cannot generally be regarded by readers 
as realistic substitutes. Note, however, that these considerations are based on qualitative 
analyses. No empirical analysis is performed to evaluate precisely the competitive 
impact of other media on the press industry. 
So far we have dealt with aspects of the printed media market that are related to 
the demand side. However, as pointed out in the Candover / Cinven / Bertelsmann-
Springer decision, a strict demand approach “would lead to the definition of a multitude 
                                                 
10 In Italy, there is no such thing as tabloids: daily newspapers are differentiated on the basis of their 
geographic circulation (local or national) and political orientation, but not so much on a “vertical” 
dimension. 
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of relevant markets of imprecise boundaries and small dimensions”, because “from a 
demand-side point of view, it is rare that two publications be viewed as perfect 
substitutes”. Therefore, another dimension of market definition that has been considered 
in antitrust cases is the supply side. In the Recoletos / Unedisa case, supply-side 
considerations are used to evaluate the substitutability between different titles, and in 
particular to assess the profitability for a publisher of launching a new title. Supply-side 
considerations are particularly relevant in cases that concern specialized publications, as 
in the Candover / Cinven / Bertelsmann-Springer case, where elements like image and 
reputation of a title, its expertise in a given area, “an image of accuracy, reliability and 
comprehensiveness in the information supplied”11 are identified as the elements 
required to launch a publication. Supply-side substitution is also considered in some UK 
cases, as for example in the Johnston Press / Trinity Mirror case. 
Finally, another important dimension along which newspapers compete are 
advertising revenues. The recognition of the two-sidedness feature is present in most 
antitrust decisions on the written press. In the Recoletos / Unedisa decision, it is stated 
that “newspapers editors operate in two broad markets: the market for written press, in 
which the consumers are the buyers of the newspaper as a source of information and the 
market for advertising space, in which the consumers are the advertisers who buy space 
in order to promote sales.” 
For this reason, the analysis of competition between newspapers in the 
advertising market often proceeds in parallel with the analysis of the readers’ market. 
The substitutability between newspapers from the point of view of advertisers is closely 
linked to the proximity of titles from the point of view of readership. In other words, as 
it is made clear in the Newspaper Publishing decision, different categories of 
newspapers “provide different channels through which to reach different socioeconomic 
groupings of readers”, and cannot therefore be considered substitutes from the point of 
view of buyers of advertising space. Therefore in many decisions of the European 
Commission the markets for advertising space are defined according to the type of 
readers to which each publication is addressed. 
Similarly, the Italian antitrust authority has identified advertising on printed 
media as a separate market with respect to advertising on television media, on the basis 
of the differences in the advertising message and on the targeted audience between the 
two types of media.12 In particular, television is described as more effective to convey 
“persuasive” advertising messages, whereas printed media would be more suitable for 
“informative” advertising. A further distinction has been made between advertising on 
daily and non-daily publications, which are considered as two separate (albeit adjacent) 
markets from the point of view of the audience (more targeted for periodical 
publications, wider for daily titles). The advertising market has been segmented even 
further in the Class Editori / Sole 24 Ore case,13 where advertising on daily papers 
specialized in business and financial information has been considered as a separate 
market with respect to advertising on newspapers of general information. In the opinion 
of the Italian antitrust authority, complementarities seem to outweigh substitutabilities 
because of the different characteristics of readerships between the two types of 
publications. 
                                                 
11 Quoted from Case No. COMP/M.3197 - CANDOVER / CINVEN / BERTELSMANN-SPRINGER, 
27/07/2003. 
12 This distinction can be found in the case Publitalia 80 / S.P.E. / S.P.I. (Provv. n. 2517, 1/12/1994). 
13 Provv. n. 3336, Class Editori / Il Sole 24 Ore, 19/10/1995. 
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An alternative definition of advertising markets is proposed by the European 
Commission in the decision Recoletos / Unedisa, where it is suggested that the sale of 
advertising space in the written press could be considered as a single market.14 This 
approach is motivated by the consideration that the written press as a whole generally 
attracts the most educated segments of society, and therefore it is already a specific 
public. The second reason adduced to justify this approach is the fact that advertising 
space is often bought by large agencies that resell it to single customers and are 
therefore more likely to purchase space in different media outlets rather than in 
specialized publications only. 
However, some qualifications of this issue are needed. First, even if it is true that 
daily newspapers of general information on average attract a more highly educated 
public than television, this is unlikely to be true for other types of publications like 
specialized magazines (think of the tabloid kind of magazines, for instance). Second,  
the fact that there are large-scale buyers of advertising space does not imply that 
different outlets are substitutable from the point of view of advertisers. These points 
therefore stand against considering the entire printed media as a single market from the 
point of view of advertising demand. 
A narrower market definition is adopted in many US cases, for example in the 
decision US vs Donrey Media Group (C.n. 95-5048), where local daily papers are 
considered as a separate market both on the readers’ market and on the advertising 
market. From the point of view of readers’ demand, even if it is true that some services 
provided by newspapers compete with radio, TV, or other publications, the decision 
says that this does not mean that these other media can be considered as belonging to 
the same market. The same definition is applied also to the advertising market: the court 
considered that a small price increase in the local daily newspaper market would not be 
constrained by other media. In particular, an expert testified that most print advertisers 
would not switch to television or radio for a price increase of less than 20%, which 
suggests a limited substitutability from the side of advertising demand. 
The UK Competition Commission performs very detailed analyses of 
competition in local advertising markets. It conducts surveys in order to assess the 
substitutability between different titles from the point of view of buyers of advertising 
space. In the case Newsquest Ltd / Independent News and Media plc, a regression 
analysis is also performed. The exercise aims at understanding the price mechanisms 
implemented by newspapers with respect to advertisers, and in particular at explaining 
the large variability in advertising rates across advertisers. An OLS regression of 
realized advertising rates on circulation (measured by copy volume) shows that for the 
titles considered higher market shares are associated with higher advertising rates. This 
finding is consistent with the direction of the inter-market network externality that links 
the readers’ market to the advertising market. 
The Competition Commission performs an analysis of market definition on the 
advertising market also in the recent case Archant Limited / Independent News and 
Media Limited (22/9/2004). A SSNIP test is invoked and quantitative survey data are 
used in order to assess whether a price increase by the merged entity could be profitable. 
Even considering the possibility of price discrimination, the Commission concludes that 
a price increase would not be profitable, and consequently defines the relevant market 
as the local one, even if a wider range of titles than the local ones are taken into account. 
                                                 
14 It should be noted, however, that the Commission did not conclude on the definition of these markets 
because under either market definition the concentration considered did not give rise to antitrust concerns. 
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Apart from limited regression analysis, market definition in printed media does 
not seem to have relied much on econometric analysis. The assessment of competition 
and substitutability between titles is conducted through qualitative considerations and 
survey methods rather than through the estimation of own and cross-elasticities. 
One recent exception is a case involving SOCPRESSE / Groupe Express-
Expansion, two publishers of magazines and newspapers in France. On this occasion, 
the French competition authority sought to define the boundaries of the market for 
weekly magazines of general information and conducted an econometric analysis to 
ascertain whether this definition should include a larger number of titles than the 
definition used in previous decisions. The objective was to estimate the cross-elasticities 
between different titles in order to decide which ones were to be included in the market 
definition. 
The econometric methodology consisted in estimating a regression based on a 
panel of the time series of market shares of circulation and cover prices with magazine 
fixed effects. More formally, the estimating equation is: 
 
ititiit ps εβα +−= , 
 
where its  represents the market share of circulation for magazine i at time t, iα  is a 
time-invariant fixed effect for each magazine, pit is the magazine’s cover price, and ε it 
is the error term. The estimated price coefficient of this regression, as well as the price 
coefficient of an aggregate demand function are then used to compute cross-price 
elasticities. 
The estimation results are not reported in the decision, but it is said that the 
estimated elasticities are small. The Commission concludes that, since the different 
titles appear to be differentiated and imperfect substitutes, it is difficult to delimit the 
exact boundaries of the market. 
These very low estimates of elasticities could be the outcome of an inadequate 
econometric specification. First, the specification does not control for other variables 
that might have an impact on readers’ demand. Some observable magazine 
characteristics, like the number of pages, the presence of dedicated sections and the age 
of the title should be regarded as important explanatory factors of readers’ demand.15 In 
other words, it seems that a missing variable problem is not correctly addressed. 
Second, the estimation may be biased due to identification problems. Since there 
is no particular reason to think that prices are exogenous or predetermined, the 
estimation methodology described in the decision may lead to a biased estimation of the 
price coefficient due to endogeneity. One solution to the endogeneity problem would be 
to instrument the prices, possibly with some cost-related variables. 
Finally, the two-sided nature of the market for printed media requires 
considering both sides of the market in the estimation model. A model that does not 
take into account the link between readers’ demand and advertising demand is 
potentially misspecified and may lead to biased estimations of price coefficient and 
                                                 
15 These are some of the explanatory variables that Kaiser (2003) included in the demand equation for 
women magazines in Germany, together with the launch of online versions. In addition, Argentesi (2004) 
includes the presence of inserts, the changes in the editorial line, and exogenous events like sport events 
or elections that might have an impact on newspapers’ circulation as explanatory variables in the 
estimation of demand for Italian newspapers. 
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related elasticities. Therefore, a structural model for the printed media industry (and for 
media industries in general) should include two demand systems, one for each side of 
the market, and link them with appropriate parameters. We propose and illustrate such a 
model in the next section. 
 
 
3. An Econometric Framework 
 
The aim of an empirical model for market definition is to provide estimates of 
demand parameters and in particular of the price sensitivity parameters which are 
crucial to determine the substitution pattern between titles. As we have already 
discussed, an econometric model for the printed media industry should be based on 
three main elements: two-sidedness; product differentiation (both vertical and 
horizontal); definition of total market size (outside good). 
Some further qualifications of the latter issue are needed. The logit model of 
demand, which is one of the most widely used econometric model for antitrust 
purposes, requires the specification of an outside option reflecting the choice of none of 
the products considered (the “inside” products). The existence of an outside good allows 
for the possibility that a homogeneous price increase of all the products considered 
decreases the aggregate quantity demanded. However, the introduction of an outside 
good imposes a measure of the market share for this good, which usually is not directly 
observed. Since the share of the outside good is the difference between the total 
(potential) size of the market and the combined shares of the inside goods, the potential 
market must be large enough to allow for a positive share of the outside good. The 
definition adopted for the total potential market size can have a significant impact on the 
estimation results. Therefore, one should test the robustness of the results using 
different specifications of the total market (and therefore of the outside option). One 
way to do that is to start with the largest possible definition and then restrict it on the 
basis of the estimated cross-price elasticities. 
In printed media industry, the potential market on the readers' side is commonly 
defined as the total population above the age of 14 (an alternative being the number of 
households above the age of 14). On the advertising market, the largest possible market 
size would include all the media, i.e., TV, radio, internet, press. As we discussed in the 
previous section, narrower definitions might be more appropriate given the limited 
substitutability between different media services.  
The model proposed below generalizes a framework introduced by Argentesi 
and Filistrucchi (2004). Market definition on both the newspaper market and the 
advertising market requires an estimation of own- and cross-price elasticities of demand 
which should be derived from the parameters of two distinct (but interconnected) 
demand models. It is therefore necessary to estimate both the demand for the newspaper 
by readers and the demand for advertising space by advertisers. We propose to estimate 
a system of logit demands (or nested logit if this is more appropriate to the market 
characteristics) where the two demand systems are linked by an inter-market network 
externality (which may be positive or negative). 
More specifically, readers’ demand for magazine j is assumed to depend on 
some observable characteristics of the magazine, on cover price, and on advertising 
quantity in the following way (the superscript N indicates newspaper or readers as 
opposed to advertising, which is indicated with A later on): 
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j ypss ξγαβ ++−=− x)ln()ln( 0 , 
 
where Njx  is a vector of characteristics that can include age (the longevity of a 
publication can explain the loyalty of readers), number of content pages (i.e., non-
advertising pages), special sections, promotions, inserts, changes of editors; Njp  is the 
cover price of the newspaper (in real terms); Ajy  is the quantity of advertising contained 
in magazine j and Njξ  is an unobservable component that can be interpreted as a fixed 
effect. 











j ypss ξγαβ ++−=− x)ln()ln( 0 . 
 
Here the vector of product characteristics can include variables related to the 
composition of audience (income, education, etc.), variables about the quantity of 
content pages of the publication, or other characteristics like the format, colour pages 
and so on. Similarly to readers’ demand, here Njy  is magazine j’s circulation, which 
may impact on advertising demand. 
The parameters Nγ  and Aγ  capture the link between the two markets. Readers’ 
demand is affected (either negatively or positively) by the amount of advertising, and 
the demand of advertising space is affected by the circulation of the magazine. 
Therefore there is a problem of endogeneity when estimating either demand system. 
Failing to consider the link with the other market (through the corresponding parameter 
γ ) leads to biased estimates of elasticities. Estimating a model like the one proposed 
here should overcome this problem and lead to a correct identification of the price 
sensitivity parameters which are the basis of any analysis of market definition. 
Still the identification issues due to the potential endogeneity of prices and 
quantities in both equations might remain. The usual to overcome this problem is by 
applying an instrumental-variables procedure. The possibility of finding suitable 
instruments for the variables of interest is often constrained by data availability. In the 




4. A Review of the Literature 
 
Despite the growing body of theoretical literature on competition and pricing in 
two-sided markets, initiated by the work of Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2004) and 
Armstrong (2004), there is still little work on the empirical implications of these 
theories and few empirical tests of two-sidedness. 
To our knowledge, the issue of market definition has not been explicitly 
considered in any recent paper. There are however a few recent empirical papers which 
analyse the printed media industry taking into account its peculiar features. Some of 
them, in order to explain the price structure in this market, focus in particular on the 
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estimation of the two-sided demand faced by printed media publishers. This is the case 
of the paper by Kaiser and Wright (2004), whose objective it is to conduct an empirical 
examination of the structure of price-cost margins between the two sides of the market. 
They estimate an adapted version of Armstrong (2004) model of competition in a two-
sided market where magazines are horizontally differentiated. The model is then tested 
on a dataset of German magazines. The model rests on the assumption that there are 
only two media outlets, which limits the applicability of the model to real-world 
situations where it is often the case that there are more than two titles competing. The 
theoretical model gives rise to a system of two demand equations, one for the 
advertising market and one for the readers’ market. The latter is assumed to depend on 
the quantity of content pages of the magazine (as opposed to advertising pages), on its 
cover price, on the quantity of advertising and on a transportation cost, which depends 
on the location of consumers in the characteristics space. Advertising demand similarly 
depends on the size of the readership, on advertising rates, and on the intrinsic 
preference of advertisers for either of the two magazines.  
The model is completed with the conditions for profit maximization for the 
magazine firm. The methodology consists of estimating the two demand systems and 
plugging the parameters obtained into the first-order conditions for profit maximization, 
under the assumption that the two firms are symmetric.16 Solving the system of FOCs 
gives the mark-up equations that are the expressions of central interest. 
The central result of the theoretical model concerns the structure of these 
margins. The model holds that “equilibrium cover prices are marked up above marginal 
cost to the extent of product differentiation on the readership side, but discounted to 
reflect the externality generated on the advertising side of the market from a magazine 
attracting more readers” (Kaiser and Wright, 2004, p. 6). Therefore if advertisers value 
readership a lot, a magazine may prefer to set a low cover price to attract readers. The 
same reasoning holds for the mark-up on advertising rates. If readers have a high 
valuation for advertising, then the mark-up might be lower than the standard one. 
The estimation results for readers’ demand suggest that the relative number of 
content pages is an important factor in determining the size of the readership. The effect 
of advertising quantity is much weaker, but is weakly positive. The coefficient of cover 
prices is not significantly different from zero, which might suggest that cover prices are 
not an important determinant in the readers’ choice. As to advertising demand, 
circulation seems to have an important effect on the share of advertising of one 
magazine versus the other. Again, the price coefficient is not statistically different from 
zero. 
The parameter estimates of the two demand systems allow inferring the implied 
price-cost structure in this two-sided market. In particular, it is useful to decompose the 
margins in the standard mark-up coming from horizontal differentiation and the 
additional term which represents the network effect. Estimates of the two network 
effects suggest that the network externality on the equilibrium cover price is much 
bigger than the externality on the equilibrium advertising price. In other words, the 
readers’ side is subsidized by the advertising side. However, the authors recognize that, 
since the estimates of the price sensitivity of demand are not precisely estimated, the 
results obtained should only be interpreted as illustrative of the role that the network 
effect can play in determining the price-cost structure in two-sided markets. 
                                                 
16 This assumption is a necessary simplification due to the impossibility of identifying all the parameters 
of the general model with a limited dataset. 
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There are two more observations that are worth mentioning about the 
methodology used in this paper. The first one concerns the specification of the model, 
and in particular the issue of identification. In both demand equations, there is an issue 
of endogeneity both with respect to prices and quantity, which is reinforced by the two-
way causation between advertising and readership. This problem is solved by using 
variables about other titles published by the same firm as instruments. For example, the 
size of the readership in the advertising demand equation is instrumented with the 
average readership of the same publisher on other magazines. This choice rests on the 
assumption that cost factors are common across titles published by the same publishing 
house. This identification strategy seems to be justified in this context by the high 
correlation that instruments show with the explanatory variables and by the fact that 
orthogonality of instruments with the residuals of the equation of interest cannot be 
rejected. However, this choice of instruments might not be appropriate in other contexts 
where the publishers do not have many comparable publications. Other possible 
instruments that have been proposed in the literature are input cost or the (exogenous) 
characteristics of other firms.17 In any case, the choice of the appropriate instruments 
should depend on data availability and on the specific characteristics of each market. 
The other observation regards the limitations implied by the assumptions of the 
theoretical model. As we have already mentioned, the applicability of the model is 
limited to cases where there are only two newspapers competing in the same market. 
Furthermore, the model assumes that the total number of readers and the total number of 
advertisers is fixed. This assumption does not allow for an outside option: All readers 
buy one magazine and all advertisers buy space in one magazine. This implies that there 
is no scope for market expansion or market reduction, and therefore implicitly that 
demand is globally inelastic to prices. In this respect, recall that in the above-mentioned 
case SOCPRESSE / Groupe Express-Expansion in France, the authority performed an 
estimation of global price elasticity, which shows that the average price of magazines 
would have a strong impact on the demand for magazines, which seems to be a piece of 
evidence contrasting with the assumption of Kaiser and Wright (2004).18 
A related paper, Kaiser (2004), builds a model of profit maximization in the 
German magazine market. The theoretical model is composed of an equation for 
readers’ demand, a behavioural equation for advertising rates, and a first-order 
condition for profit maximization. Readers’ demand is estimated with a nested logit 
model, assuming that demand depends on content and the share of advertising pages as 
in Kaiser and Wright (2004). This specification takes into account the link between the 
readers’ market and the advertising market. Moreover, it overcomes the two problems 
of that paper mentioned above. First, it considers the existence of an outside good, 
because the nested logit model explicitly allows for the possibility that consumer do not 
buy anything. Second, it can be applied to markets with more than two competitors. 
However, compared to Kaiser and Wright (2004), Kaiser (2004) puts much more 
structure on the formulation of the advertising side. Advertising prices are assumed to 
                                                 
17 As motivated in Berry (1994) and Nevo (2001), the characteristics of products produced by other firms 
are appropriate instruments because they are correlated with price through the condition for profit 
maximization, but are assumed to be exogenous to the model. 
18 To estimate cross-elasticities in the SOCPRESSE / Groupe Express-Expansion case, the methodology 
adopted by the Conseil de la Concurrence requires estimating the price elasticity of the aggregate demand 
in this market. This estimation is based on a time-series regression which explains the consumption of 
magazines by global consumption and by the evolution of relative cover prices of magazines with respect 
to some consumer price index. 
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be a function of previous period circulation and a vector of observed and unobserved 
characteristics of the magazine and of the readership. Advertising quantity is instead 
assumed to be fixed. 
The model is closed by a first-order condition for profit maximization. The only 
choice variable of the magazine firm is assumed to be cover price, because advertising 
rates are assumed to adjust in the way described above and advertising quantity is fixed. 
The first-order condition leads to a mark-up formula for cover prices which has similar 
characteristics to the one of Kaiser and Wright (2004), with the difference that here 
there is only one mark-up instead of two. Cover price deviates from the usual mark-up 
formula by a term that depends on the circulation elasticity of advertising demand: the 
less elastic advertising demand is to circulation, the more cover price deviates from the 
standard mark-up formula. 
An interesting result that comes from readers’ demand estimation is that 
consumers seem to have a taste for advertising. This would confirm the importance of 
considering advertising content in order to avoid possible biases in the estimation of 
readers’ demand, at least for magazines. This would also confirm the theory of the 
“circulation spiral” of Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2002), whereby the 
circumstance that readers like advertising and advertisers look for readers leads to 
equilibria where both the readers’ market and the advertising market are fully 
monopolised by a single firm. However, Kaiser (2004) seems to draw opposite 
conclusions from his results. Given the structure of the price cost margin, an increase in 
cover price by a merging firm would have a negative impact on advertising and would 
not be always profitable. This conclusion, however, does not seem to take into account 
that, if the externalities linking the two markets are both positive, the circulation spiral 
effect might lead to an increase of market power on both markets, ending at the extreme 
case to monopolization. 
Estimating market power is the objective of the paper by Argentesi and 
Filistrucchi (2004), who perform an empirical analysis on the Italian newspaper market. 
As in the previous two papers, the model consists of three main elements: a demand 
equation for readership, a demand equation for advertising, and a profit maximizing 
condition. The paper is aimed at estimating the strength of competition in the market by 
comparing the estimated price-cost margins under the alternative hypotheses of 
oligopolistic competition and collusion with some measure of observed costs in order to 
assess which is the true structure of the market.  
The specification of the two demand systems is similar to the one proposed in 
this paper, except for the fact that in the basic version advertising is not included as an 
explanatory variable in readers’ demand. This assumption is made for simplicity but it 
is also justified by the fact that the publications considered are national newspapers of 
general information, where the role of advertising quantity in determining demand does 
not seem to be as crucial as for magazines. Newspapers’ demand is estimated with a 
logit model, which captures the feature of product differentiation that characterizes this 
market. 
The link between the two markets is due to the fact that advertising demand is 
function of circulation. Advertising demand is not assumed to follow a specific 
behavioural function as in Kaiser (2004) model, but is estimated with a logit model. 
This requires a definition of total market size, which raises the issue, already mentioned, 
on the definition of boundaries of the advertising market. In particular, it should be 
assessed to what extent other media provide a substitute to the newspapers considered 
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from the point of view of advertisers, which is an important issue for market definition 
analysis. 
The profit maximization condition on cover prices gives an expression for mark-
up similar to the ones derived in the papers previously discussed. The implication is that 
the optimal cover price is lower than the standard mark-up because of the impact of the 
advertising market, which reduces the incentive to increase price because this would 
reduce the readership and as a consequence advertising demand. 
All the three models discussed above constitute attempts to incorporate the two-
sidedness of the market into the econometric analysis of printed media markets. 
Gronnevet and Steen (2004) in a recent paper consider another possible source of bias 
that can arise in the estimation of demand in these industries. The source of endogeneity 
stems from the choice of a newspaper’s political line. Choosing whether to adopt a 
political profile or not is considered as a strategic decision for the newspaper. Given that 
the political line is a potential determinant of newspaper demand, one would be tempted 
to include a political dummy in the demand estimation. However, since the choice of 
the political profile is endogenous, this would raise problems of identification. The 
authors propose therefore a two-step estimation procedure which allows solving this 
endogeneity problem. 
All the models presented in this section provide different ways to estimate 
demand taking into account the distinguishing features of printed media markets. 
Correct demand estimation is the basis for a sensible analysis for market definition, 
because the latter relies on elasticity estimates to draw conclusions on the degree of 
substitutability between media outlets. As we have seen, the biases in the demand 
estimation can have different sources, and market definition analysis should rely more 




5. An Econometric Illustration 
 
We use a dataset on French magazines and construct a demand system based on 
a nested logit model of readers' demand.19 The nested logit model assumes that there are 
two levels in the choice of consumers: A consumer first chooses among the available 
magazines; then he has to decide between buying a one-year subscription and buying 
the magazine each week at the newsstand. The first decision also includes the option to 
choose an “outside” magazine or another type of printed media. The model is motivated 
by evidence suggesting that there are relevant differences among the publications 
considered in terms of the ratio subscriptions/unit sales. In particular, the magazines 
could be broadly grouped in three classes according to the proportion of subscriptions 
with respect to newsstand sales. Figure 1 displays these three groups. Clearly the three 
magazines La Vie, Pélerin, and Valeurs Actuelles are mainly distributed through 
subscription. In contrast, Marianne, Paris Match, VSD and Figaro Magazine are bought 
each week at newsstands by customers. In between there are magazines having more 
balanced distribution schemes. These three groups correspond to different types of 
magazines. Magazines distributed by subscription have a smaller and more specific 
                                                 
19 See Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) for further details on this model. 
ELENA ARGENTESI AND MARC IVALDI 
 - 15 -
audience, while magazines usually sold per unit have a much broader audience and have 
a reputation of building their image around scoops or strongly emotional events.20 
After estimating the model without considering the advertising market, we 
estimate the same system by using a measure of advertising revenues as an instrument 
and show how elasticity estimates change due to the above-mentioned endogeneity 
problem. 
The dataset consists of a panel of eight French magazines from 1996 to 2001.21 
For each magazine, the dataset contains information on circulation, subscriptions, sales 
at newsstand, free distribution, cover prices, subscription fees, and revenues (both total 
and from sales only). The difference between the total turnover and the total sales from 
subscriptions and unit purchases is roughly a measure of revenues from advertising. By 
dividing this measure by the number of free copies, we derive a proxy for the price of 
advertising per free distribution. 
 
 








































































The demand model is specified as: 
 
0ln( ) ln( ) ln( )xj j j jj ms s p sβ α σ ξ− = − + + , 
 
where js  is the market share of magazine j in the whole market, 0s  is the market share 
of all alternative magazines (namely, the outside alternative measured by the total 
number of magazines sold in France), j ms  is the market share of magazine j in the group 
                                                 
20 This is not true for Figaro Magazine which is sold as a supplement with the weekend edition of the 
daily newspaper “Le Figaro.” 
21 Four magazines – Courrier International, Marianne, Pélerin and Télérama – have been excluded from 
the dataset used for estimation either because of lack of data or because they are not strictly comparable 
to the included magazines. For instance, Télérama is considered as TV magazine rather than a news 
magazine. 
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of magazines sold under subscription or unit purchase, x j  is a set of exogenous 
variables to measure the specific reputation of each magazine by means of a dummy 
variable for each magazine, a dummy to signal the distribution mode, the number of 
issues per year and a time trend, and jp  is the unit price or the subscription price (per 
issue) according to the chosen mode of purchase. The parameter α  measures the 
sensitivity of the representative customer’s utility to prices, while the parameter vector 
β  provides a measure of the sensitivity of the representative customer’s utility to 
quality. The parameter σ  indicates how demand is affected by the differentiation in 
terms of distribution systems. Finally, jξ  is a random term measuring the effect of 
unobservable variables that enter the mean value of each magazine.22 
 We build a system of two equations, one for the demand of magazine j sold 
under subscription and one for the demand of magazine j sold under unit purchase. We 
estimate the model using three stages non linear least squares under two alternative set 
of instruments. In the first case, the set of instruments include all exogenous variables 
and the previous year's circulation. Given the paucity of this dataset, this is basically the 
only way to care for the endogeneity problem. In the second set of instruments, we 
replace the previous year’s circulation by our proxy for the price of advertising 
revenues, its lagged value and the number of free and complimentary copies. 
 We have selected this last set of instruments in order to minimize the objective 
function and to increase the identification of parameters of interest. In both cases, the 
parameter σ  is significant and well identified. Its estimated value (0.52 with a t-ratio of 
1.95 under the second set of instruments) shows that the differentiation in terms of 
purchase or distribution mode matters. However, the parameter α  which is not 
significantly different from zero under the first set of instruments becomes significant 
under the second set of instruments. Moreover the first stage R-square which is a 
measure of the goodness and relevance of instruments increases with the estimation 
made with the second set of instruments.23 
 The results for the estimated own- and cross-elasticities provided in Tables 1 and 
2 are striking. Note in particular that, when advertising is used as an instrument, the 
range of values taken by the own price elasticities increases. In the first case, i.e., when 
advertising is not used as an instrument, the range of values for elasticities is between 
0.20 and 0.36 while elasticities takes values between 0.67 and 1.22 when advertising is 
an instrument. Not only the average value of own price elasticities increases but also the 
spread of values. Note also that the demand of some magazines becomes elastic. 
 Estimated values for all cross-price elasticities increase drastically, providing 
much more room for substitution between magazines. The values of cross-elasticities 




                                                 
22 This model is discussed by Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) in detail. 
23 The estimated value of α  is equal to 0.36 (with a t-ratio of 2.01) under the second set of instruments 
and 0.11 (with a t-ratio of 0.34) under the first set of instruments. Detailed results are available from the 
authors. 
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Table 1: Own Price Elasticities for Some French Magazines 
 
 Estimation without 
advertising as an 
instrument 
Estimation with 
advertising as an 
instrument 
































Note: Each cell provides the estimated value of the elasticity and, in parentheses and italics, 





Table 2: Cross Price Elasticities for Some French Magazines 
 
 Estimation without 
advertising as an 
instrument 
Estimation with 
advertising as an 
instrument 
































Note: Each cell provides the estimated value of the elasticity and, in parentheses and italics, 
the empirical standard deviations. 
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These results are just illustrative of the bias that can arise in the estimation of 
elasticities if the feedback effect between the two sides of the market is neglected. It 
would be better to specify a full econometric model which encompasses both sides of 
the market simultaneously, in the spirit of the framework advanced in Section 3. 
Nonetheless, the estimation exercise proposed in this section gives some support to the 
conclusions we have drawn before and invites to estimate a two-sided markets type 
model to define the relevant market. 
Meanwhile going from the first set of estimates to the second set when 
advertising is used as an instrument could modify the policy conclusion. If demands for 
magazines were inelastic and if magazines were not substitutes, the relevant market 
could shrink to the magazine itself. In terms of the antitrust policy, a merger in this 
industry would not be investigated, and its impact would not be perceived, in the same 
way. Recall that mergers between complements are not harmful. In terms of the 
regulation policy, the monitoring of each magazine could be tightened up in order to 





This paper discusses the issue of market definition in the context of printed 
media markets. The issue is crucial for two reasons. First, technological progress is 
rapidly changing the boundaries of media markets making the exercise more complex 
and sensible. Secondly, media markets are characterized by peculiar features that should 
be taken into account in the analysis of market definition and market power. In 
particular, the econometric models that are increasingly used to implement the SSNIP 
test should incorporate the elements of two-sidedness that are intrinsic to these markets. 
We review some recent antitrust cases and show to which extent these 
characteristics of printed media markets have been taken into account. The importance 
of considering these peculiar features increases with the use of econometric models in 
antitrust analysis. Failing to consider them may lead to biased estimates of own- and 
cross-elasticities. We illustrate the bias that can arise in the estimation of elasticities 
with an econometric exercise on a dataset of French magazines. We compare two 
alternative specifications of readers' demand for magazines, one without advertising and 
one where advertising is used as an instrument, and show that neglecting the effect of 
advertising may have a relevant impact on the estimated elasticities. 
A proper econometric model for the estimation of elasticities waits to be built. 
We propose a framework to model the two-sided demand that characterizes printed 
media markets. Alternative methodologies are also conceivable and we discuss some 
approaches that have recently been proposed in the literature. Given the topicality of the 
issue of market definition in media industries and the need of finding appropriate 
econometric models to implement it, further research is needed to capture the 
complexity of this industry. 
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